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Abstract. Conventional R&D-based growth theory suggests that productiv-
ity growth is positively correlated with population size or population growth,
an implication which is hard to see in the data. Here we integrate R&D-based
growth into a unied growth setup with micro-founded fertility and schooling
behavior. We then show how a Beckerian child quality-quantity trade-o ex-
plains why higher growth of productivity and income per capita are associated
with lower population growth. The medium-run prospects for future economic
growth { when fertility is going to be below replacement level in virtually all
developed countries { are thus much better than predicted by conventional
R&D-based growth theory.
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Vienna, Austria.1. Introduction
A characteristic feature of economic theories designed to explain the performance of human so-
cieties over the very long run is that they are emphasizing the interaction between economic and
demographic variables as crucial for our understanding of economic development (see Galor, 2005,
2011 for surveys). Broadly speaking, these \unied growth theories" explain why the demo-economic
history of countries or regions can be conceptualized as subdivided into two periods: the Malthusian
era and the modern era. During the Malthusian era fertility is high, the population is gradually
expanding fueled by (relatively small) productivity gains, and income is almost constant at a low
level. During the modern era fertility is low and productivity gains translate into perpetual economic
growth at high and (ideally) constant rates. Both eras are connected by a demographic transition
during which fertility declines and the economic growth takes o. Usually it is assumed that the
process ends in a state of stationary (or growing) population.
This paper introduces a third era to the analysis of long-run growth, the post-modern era. The
characteristic feature of the post-modern era is a secular trend of declining population. So far,
the consequences of a declining population have been relatively little researched in the eld of
long-run economic growth. Many theories were based on the assumption of a constant population.
This assumption was until recently in line with many demographic projections, which predicted
that the demographic transition comes to its end when fertility rates approach replacement level.
For example, past population projections of the United Nations and the World Bank assumed in
their medium variants (which were regarded as most likely) that fertility rates everywhere converge
towards 2.1 births per women (Bongaarts, 1999).
Actually, however, the idea that the demographic transition stops at replacement level is refuted
by empirical evidence. The total fertility rate (TFR) fell below replacement level in the 1970s in
Europe and Japan, in the 1980s in North America and Australia, and in the 1990s in the Asian
Tiger countries (Bongaarts, 2001). It is now below replacement level in all 50 European countries
but Turkey (where it is at 2.15) and in more than 80 countries in the world (UN, 2011). Table 1.A,
compiled from UN (2011), shows the most recently observed TFR for the G-8 countries, i.e. those
countries that we usually associate with production at the \frontier of technological knowledge"
(Aghion and Howitt, 2009). In every country that contributes substantially to innovation-based,
R&D-driven growth the TFR is below replacement level.
1Table 1.A: TFR for the G-8: 2005-10
USA 2.07 France 1.97
U.K. 1.83 Canada 1.65
Italy 1.38 Germany 1.36
Russia 1.44 Japan 1.32





Among the developed countries the U.S. is unique in displaying a TFR close to replacement
level. Table 1:b, compiled from U.S. National Center for Health Statistics (2010), shows that this
achievement originates solely from the high TFR of the Hispanic part of the population. The TFR
of non-Hispanic whites (1.83), for example, is close to that of their European forefathers. Assuming
that fertility behavior of immigrants is at least partly rooted in the fertility norms of their country
of origin we expect fertility of the Hispanic population in the U.S. to fall below replacement level
with ongoing fertility transition in the countries of origin. Some Latin American countries (e.g.
Chile, Brazil, Cuba) display already fertility below replacement and for other countries this seems
to be likely in the future. In 2008 the United Nations updated their medium-variant projection,
now assuming that all countries in the world converge towards a TFR of 1.85 in the long run, i.e. a
fertility pronouncedly below replacement level (UN, 2008). Inspired by some recent mild recoveries
of fertility the latest UN projection assumes again convergence towards replacement level, albeit
with heavy undershooting; for Europe, Asia, and Latin America the TFR is predicted to remain
below replacement level over the whole 21. century.
There is evidence, however, that the UN assumption of fertility rates converging towards replace-
ment level in the medium run could be too optimistic. Strulik and Vollmer (2010) show that the
countries of the world can be subdivided into two fertility groups: in one group fertility rates are
converging, in the other group fertility rates are not converging, indicating that the fertility tran-
sition is not yet initiated or yet too slow for catching up with the forerunners of the transition.
For the convergence-group Strulik and Vollmer show a strong linear correlation of initial fertility in
1950 (F50) and fertility reduction 1950-2005 (F) with no indication of leveling o at low fertility
rates. The prediction implied by the estimated -convergence equation F = 0:82   0:73F50 is a
steady-state (long-run equilibrium) at a TFR of 0:82=0:73 = 1:12, i.e. somewhat more than one child
per women, almost about half of replacement fertility.
The observation that fertility is below replacement in virtually every developed country has mo-
tivated demographers to speak of \post-transitional" societies (e.g. Bongaarts, 2001). This cate-
gorization, however, could be misleading. It could be interpreted as indicating that the fertility
2transition has been accomplished. As shown above, this is not yet the case. Fertility rates continue
to fall, although { according to  convergence { at subsequently lower rates. It may thus be more
appropriate to follow van der Kaa (2001) and speak of post-modern societies.1
While post-modernity is a complex idea and post-modern values and their emphasis of private life
and material goods (instrumental post-modernism) or the public world and social goods (humanist
post-modernism) may aect virtually every aspect of life, we focus here on one aspect: the demand
for children. The post-modern society is characterized by values and norms such that couples on
average give birth to fewer than two children (van de Kaa, 2001, Caldwell and Schindlmayer, 2003,
Preston and Hartnett, 2008). Subsequently we take preferences as given and ask for the consequences
on economic growth.
According to conventional theories of R&D-based growth, the fact that the population is declining
entails a grim economic outlook for post-modern societies. Models of the rst generation (Romer,
1990, Aghion and Howitt, 1992) provide the result that growth of aggregate productivity (TFP)
is linearly related to population size. Thus, a declining population implies vanishing growth of
productivity and income per capita. According to models of the second generation (Jones, 1995,
Kortum, 1997, Segerstrom, 1998), TFP growth is linearly related to population growth. If we would
rule out declining productivity, these models would predict for the post-modern era stagnation of
productivity and income per capita.2
Fortunately, the empirical evidence does not support these predictions. Many studies have demon-
strated a negative association between population growth and income growth (e.g. Brander and
Dowrik, 1994, Kelley and Schmidt, 1995, Ahituv, 2001, and Herzer et al., 2010). Also the positive
association between population growth and productivity growth predicted by conventional R&D-
based growth theory is hard to see in the data. Because knowledge spillovers decline with distance
and are smaller across countries than within countries (Jae et al., 1993, Keller, 2002, Bottazzi and
Peri, 2003), we would expect that at least some of the high TFP growth generated in countries
where population growth is high to be visible in the data. Figure 1 shows average annual population
growth against average annual TFP growth from 1950 to 2000 (calculated from the data in Baier et
1In the very long run it is probably also hard to imagine that world population declines forever, i.e. until extinction.
At some point we may expect that economic mechanism increase the rewards for children strongly enough to initiate
a turn of the fertility transition towards convergence to replacement level from below.
2R&D Models of the third generation (Peretto, 1998; Young, 1998; and Howitt, 1999) combine features of the earlier
generations by investigating quality R&D and variety R&D. Assuming that there exist no knowledge spillovers between
quality and variety R&D they predict that only variety growth is essentially associated with population growth while
constant quality growth requires a constant population. See Jones (1999) for a survey.
3al, 2006). Across all countries for which data is available (identied in the Figure by blue crosses)
the simple correlation is clearly negative (see Bernanke and Guerkaynak, 2001, for a similar nding).
Figure 1: Population Growth vs. TFP Growth 1950 - 2000



















Growth rates are average annual growth rates 1950-2000 calculated from Baier et
al. (2006). Blue crosses: all available countries, green circles: OECD countries, red
squares: G7 countries.
For a proper check of R&D-based growth theory, however, it seems reasonable to reduce the
sample, acknowledging the fact that less developed countries { where usually population growth is
highest { do not much advance TFP growth by market R&D activities. But if we focus just on
OECD countries (green circles in the Figure) the predicted positive association is still not visible.
Even if we assume that conventional R&D-based growth theory applies foremost to the G7 countries,
i.e. a small group of countries that pushes the world technology frontier (identied in the Figure by
red squares), the predicted positive association remains invisible.3
In order to explore the association between TFP and population growth a bit further, we con-
structed TFP growth rates and growth rates of the labor force in ten year steps between 1940 and
2000 for a sample of 67 countries using the data from Baier et al. (2006). This allows us to ex-
pand the sample size considerably and, more importantly, it enables us to control for country- and
time-specic xed eects. The model that we estimate reads
gi;t = 1 + 2log(Li;t) + i + t + ui;t; (1)
3Data for Germany is missing in Figure 1 and the regressions below. But given (West-) Germany's exceptionally low
fertility rates and relatively high TFP growth rates, it can be conjectured that including Germany would certainly
corroborate the result.
4where gi;t is average TFP growth in country i between time t and t   1, log(Li;t) is the average
growth rate of the labor force in county i between time t and time t 1, i are country specic xed
eects, t are time specic xed eects, ui;t is the error term and 1 and 2 are the coecients to
be estimated. The results are reported in Table 2 for the total sample referred to as \World", the
OECD countries referred to as \OECD" and for the G7 countries except Germany.
Table 2: The Association between TFP and Population Growth 2
two-way fe two-way re cross-section fe pooled OLS
World OECD G7 World OECD G7 World OECD G7 World OECD G7
2 -0.89 -1.11 -1.04 -1.10 -1.04 -0.77 -1.08 -1.33 -0.95 -1.21 -1.16 -0.77
t-value -5.29 -3.79 -0.89 -8.48 -4.83 -1.05 -6.18 -4.38 -0.93 -8.61 -4.79 -0.98
R2 0.36 0.33 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.03 0.25 0.19 0.05 0.17 0.14 0.03
N 402 156 36 402 156 36 402 156 36 402 156 36
List of countries: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland,
France, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica,
Japan, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay,
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria,
Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, UK, Uruguay, USA, Venezuela, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
As Table 2 documents, the central qualitative result of a negative correlation between TFP growth
and population growth is robust to model specications with respect to country- and time-specic
xed eects. Furthermore, considering a random eects estimator does not change the qualitative
results either. The correlation is highly signicantly negative for the world and the OECD. For the
G7, which is actually only a \G6" since data for Germany is missing, the estimate loses precision.
Given that there are only six countries, including one prominent outlier (the US), this seems to be a
natural result. In any case, we do not nd supporting evidence for a positive correlation between TFP
growth and population growth. In our favorite specication, the two-way xed eects regression,
the estimated slope is about unity across samples, suggesting that a decrease of population growth
translates one-to-one into an increase of TFP growth. Given the possibility of reverse causality,
these exercises are, of course, not sucient to reject a potential causal positive impact of population
growth on TFP growth. But it is hard to come up with a mechanism strong enough to overturn
such a positive impact so that it becomes invisible in the data.
Shifting the focus towards population levels and a historical perspective of technology evolution
over the very long-run, Comin et al. (2010) have recently shown that across countries the current
level of technology is positively associated with the level of technology in the year 1500 and negatively
associated with population size in 1500. Interestingly they have also shown a positive association of
5population size in year 0 AD with the level of technology in 1500. Thus the population push view that
a larger population produces more ideas (see also Kremer, 1993, Strulik and Weisdorf, 2008) seems
to be true in the ancient and medieval past but not for modern societies. The present paper oers
an explanation for this phenomenon by arguing that the reversal occurred when a child-quantity
substitution became operative and parents began to invest in education of their children.
Below we propose a rened view on the human factor in TFP growth and argue that it is not the
sheer number of workers (L) that propels the creation of ideas and the advancement of productivity
but the total amount of knowledge embodied in these workers, i.e. aggregate human capital (H).
The most intuitive aggregation is probably that aggregate human capital is given by human capital
per worker h times the number of workers (H = h  L). Utilizing this notion of human capital
and endogenizing the incentive to acquire it through costly schooling, a couple of papers have
demonstrated that human capital growth can take over the role of population growth in R&D-based
growth models by predicting that productivity growth can be sustained with constant or declining
population as long as human capital is accumulated rapidly enough. This prediction is less easily
refuted by the data since empirical evidence supports a positive association between proxies of human
capital accumulation and growth of income per capita and TFP.4
While the integration of human capital accumulation into R&D-based growth theory provides a
way around the need for constant population size or a positive rate of population growth in order to
sustain long-run economic growth, the so far available literature has left unsolved the problem of the
potentially negative association of population growth and TFP growth. To be specic, acknowledging
that aggregate human capital, H = h  L, matters for the creation of new ideas, the fundamental
problem is to explain why productivity growth seems to be positively associated with increasing h
and negatively associated with increasing L. This problem remained unsolved because the available
literature has neglected the interaction of quantity and quality of the workforce.
Indeed, there exists no obvious way to explain at the macro-level how L and h could potentially
contribute conversely to the aggregate h  L. On the micro-level, however, there exists a well-
established and tested theory precisely for this, the Beckerian child quantity-quality trade-o (Becker,
1960, Rosenzweig, Wolpin, 1980, Rosenzweig, 1990, Hanushek, 1992, Becker et al., 2010, Lee and
4For theory see, among others, Arnold (1998), Funke and Strulik (2000), Dalgaard and Kreiner (2001), Strulik (2005),
Dalgaard and Jensen (2009), Grossmann (2010). For evidence see Bernanke and Guerkaynak (2001), Barro (2001),
Krueger and Lindahl (2001). Authors of the original R&D-based growth model sometimes acknowledge the fact that
it is H rather than L that drives the development of new ideas, see e.g. Romer (1990). However, this observation has
not motivated them to integrate an explanation of the accumulation of H into the model.
6Mason, 2010). This mechanism, which plays also a crucial role in unied growth theory (Galor,
2005), allows parents to substitute child quality for child quantity such that h rises and L falls. If
the substitution is such that h rises more strongly than L falls, the micro-foundation can motivate
that aggregate human capital H in a society rises although the population declines. If, in turn, the
development of ideas and thus TFP growth is driven by H, the micro-foundation explains why we
observe a negative association between TFP growth and population growth at the macro-level.
Utilizing these ideas, the present paper integrates for the rst time R&D-based growth into a
unied growth theory based on a micro-founded child quantity-quality trade-o and shows why and
how the preference for less children promotes human capital accumulation and economic growth.
This way, R&D-based growth theory is accommodated to the evidence on education, fertility and
TFP growth. At the same time the \old" theory is not completely abandoned. It is still there
when the corner solution for education applies. If preferences do not support a quantity-quality
substitution, increasing fertility and population growth contribute positively to economic growth as
evidenced for most of human history. On the other hand, if the quantity-quality trade-o is operative,
the direction of the aggregate eect is independent from family size and, in particular, also observed
for fertility below replacement level. Taken together these results identify child quantity-quality
substitution as the causal driver of R&D-based growth for post-modern societies.5
The paper is organized as follows. The next section sets up the model. Section 3 analyzes the
balanced growth path and proves our main results. Section 4 species the model numerically and
investigates adjustment over the the very long-run. It demonstrates that our theoretical results for
the balanced growth path hold also true along the transition. Furthermore it oers novel insights
about the onset of innovation based growth (the rst Industrial Revolution) and mass education
driven growth (the second Industrial Revolution). The nal section concludes with a tentative
outlook for future economic development.
2. The Model
2.1. Households. Consider an economy populated by three overlapping generations, children, young
adults, and old adults. Children consume the provisions received by their parents and old adults
consume their savings plus interest. Young adults supply one unit of labor and decide how to split
5So far, a few articles have integrated endogenous fertility into R&D-based growth, notably Jones (2001), Connolly and
Peretto (2003) and Growiec (2006). Articles integrating education have been referenced above. To our best knowledge,
an integration of R&D-based growth theory into unied growth theory, that is into a framework in which both fertility
and education are micro-founded, does not yet exist.
7their income between current consumption and future consumption, how many children they want
to have, and how much they want to spend on their children's education.
In order to convey the basic theory conveniently and to get explicit solutions, we make a number
of simplifying assumptions. Each household consists of one parent (which avoids to tackle matching
problems), there is no explicit consideration of mortality (which avoids problems of uncertain sur-
vival), children are a continuous number (which avoids problems of indivisibility), and the motive
of child expenditure is non-operational (which avoids problems of maximizing dynastic value func-
tions). This means that parents' motivation to spend on children's education is not driven by the
anticipation of the increase of children's utility caused by this expenditure but by a \warm glow" of
giving (Andreoni, 1989) or the desire for having \higher quality"children (Becker, 1960).
To be specic let c1
t and c2
t denote consumption of the young and old in period t. The currently
young, facing a gross interest rate Rt+1, and making a savings decision st, expect future consumption
c2
t+1 = Rt+1st. A young adult's human capital is denoted by ht and the wage per unit of human
capital is denoted by wt. Let nt denote the number of children and  the time cost involved in having
a child.6 Children acquire a minimum skill-level of  e by observing and imitating parents and peers at
work. To increase skills beyond this minimum level parents may spend et per child, conceptualized
in the Beckerian sense as child quality expenditure. Plugged into a function for education, education
determines the human capital endowment of next period's generation (ht+1). Since the parameters
of education and future wages are given to the single adult, having expenditure on education  e + et
or next period's endowments ht+1, or wage income of their children wt+1ht+1 in the utility function




t +  log(Rt+1st) +  log( e + et) +  lognt
subject to the budget constraint wtht(1 nt) = c1
t +st+ntet. All variables have to be non-negative.
The positive parameters , , and  denote the weights of future consumption, child expenditure,
and family size for utility, i.e. the importance of these elements relative to current consumption. In
order to get a meaningful problem in which a population of positive size exists, we assume  > ,
which ensures that nt > 0. With respect to education, however, no such logically argument can be
made, implying that et could be positive or zero depending on whether the non-negativity constraint
et  0 is binding or not.
6Following Galor (2005) nt could be interpreted as the number of children up to adulthood, implicitly assuming that
child costs are only associated with surviving children.
8From the rst order conditions we obtain the solution (2) for consumption and savings regardless
of whether education is interior or at the corner.
ct =
1
1 +  + 
 wtht; st =

1 +  + 
 wtht: (2)
For child quantity and quality there exists a threshold at z   e=(). If income falls below the
threshold parents do not invest in education and focus on maximizing child quantity. In particular





0 for wtht < z
wtht    e







(1 +  + ) for wtht < z
(   )wtht
(1 +  + )(wtht    e) otherwise :
(4)
Once income surpasses the threshold z a fertility transition is initiated: further rising income leads
to declining fertility and increasing expenditure for education. While education expenditure is not
bounded, fertility arrives at a lower bound as income approaches innity.
lim
wtht!1
nt = n 
   
(1 +  + )
: (5)
Note that nothing prevents n to fall below the replacement rate of unity. In particular, n < 1 for
 > ( )=(1++). While most of the (unied) growth literature implicitly or explicitly assumes
that the fertility transition ends at a fertility rate of unity, this paper focusses on the case where
preferences for child quantity  are suciently low, or preferences for quality  or time costs of
children  are suciently high such that the fertility transition eventually drives nt below unity.
We associate this phenomenon { in line with the arguments developed in the Introduction { with a
post-modern society.
2.2. Education. Child expenditure et is transformed into human capital of the next generation of
young adults via a schooling technology. A reasonable technology does not just translate expenditure
one to one into human capital but controls also for the costs of schooling. These costs can be
conveniently approximated by the wage wt, i.e. the cost of a unit of human capital of the current adult
(teacher-) generation. The simplest conceivable schooling technology is given by ht+1 = AE(et=wt)+ e
in which AE signies general productivity of schooling. Without education expenditure, human
9capital of the next generation consists of basic skills picked up from observing and mimicking parents










+  e: (6)
With growing income wtht human capital creation converges towards a linear dierence equation,









The fact that h is constant permits perpetual long-run growth (if h is larger than unity). We
discuss the case of impossible perpetual growth in the Conclusion.
2.3. Firms: Overview. The setup of rms and markets follows closely Romer (1990) and Jones
(1995). The economy consists of three sectors: The R&D-sector is perfectly competitive and employs
scientists to create new ideas in the form of blueprints, manifested in patents. A patent is needed as
xed input in a monopolistically competitive sector to produce a specialized capital good. Purchase
of a patent allows a capital goods producer to transform one unit of raw capital, i.e. one unit of
individual's savings, into one blueprint-specic machine. A perfectly competitive nal goods sector
uses these machines and workers to assemble a consumption aggregate.
Aside from the setup in discrete time the \only" modication of the rm's side of the Romer-Jones
model is that the human factor in production is human capital Ht = htLt where Lt is the size of
the current generation of young adults. Note that this aggregation of individual human capital ht
implies an innite elasticity of substitution between human capital per person and persons. It means
that any lack of human capital that a rm's currently employed workers may display can be taken
care of by just employing more workers of the same skill level.
2.4. Final goods sector. Since the rms' side of the model { aside from the special role of human
capital { coincides with the Romer-Jones setup, description can be brief. The nal goods sector
7Whereas some elements of the schooling function could be made more general, controlling for the teacher- generation's
wage is essential for stability. Otherwise human capital would grow hyper-exponentially, driven by increasing ht and
rising wt. A similar control for the current state of quality is known to be essential for stability in R&D-driven quality
improvements of products, see e.g. Li (2000).







in which Yt is output, Bt is factor productivity, and HY
t is employment. The parameter  is the
capital share in nal goods production, xi;t is the amount of a certain machine i used in nal goods
production and At is the number of available dierentiated inputs. Facing a wage wt per unit of
human capital, and rental prices pi;t for capital inputs i = 1;:::;A, the indirect demand functions
are given by












2.5. Capital Goods Production. Producers of specialized inputs transform one unit of raw capital
into one unit of specialized capital such that kt = xt. Operating prots of an intermediate goods
producer i;t are thus given by i;t = pi;t(xi;t)ki;t   rtki;t = Bt(HY
t )1 (ki;t)   rtki;t where rt
denotes the interest rate that has to be paid for individual's savings. Solving the associated problem
of prot maximization facing demand (10) leads to the price of pi;t = pt = rt= for all i = 1;:::;A
types of machines so that the machine-specic index can be dropped.
Free entry into capital goods production implies that in equilibrium operating prots are covering
the xed costs of production originating from purchasing a patent. In slight deviation from the
original setup and inspired by Aghion and Howitt (2009, Chapter 4) we assume that a patent holds
for one period (i.e. one generation) and that afterwards the monopoly right to produce a good
passes to someone chosen at random from the next generation. This simplication helps to avoid
intertemporal (dynastic) problems of patent holding and patent pricing while keeping the basic
incentive to create new knowledge intact. Summarizing, free entry implies i;t = t = pA
t where pA
t
is the price of a patent (blueprint).
Because capital goods are sold at the same price and demanded at equal quantities, xi;t = xt and
they can be added up to the aggregate capital stock Kt = Atxt. Inserting this information into the





11The number of developed specialized inputs appears as aggregate productivity in goods production.
We thus have two forces driving aggregate productivity. First, At which is driven by the development
of new products through market R&D and, second, Bt which may rise for exogenous reasons, most
naturally through learning by-doing.
Standard R&D-based growth theory usually neglects learning-by-doing because it focusses solely
on modern economies. Here, within a unied growth setting, which encompasses centuries or mil-
lennia of economic development, we need a force to drive productivity growth before the onset of
market R&D. In line with Kremer (1993), Galor and Weil (2000), Galor (2005) we assume that
these learning-by-doing activities depend positively on the scale of the economy measured by pop-
ulation size, (Bt+1   Bt)=Bt = ~ g(Lt), @~ g=@L  0, @2~ g=@L2  0. The learning-by-doing mechanism
is appropriate to investigate technological and economic development for most of human history
because technological advances were not (much) brought forward by formally trained scientists be-
fore the industrial revolution (Mokyr, 2002). Thus, while integrating learning-by-doing activities is
unnecessary with respect to our main objective, that is the analysis of R&D-driven growth in the
post modern society, it adds { at little notational cost { more realism to the predicted historical
adjustment dynamics for the very long-run.
2.6. R&D. Between periods t and t + 1 competitive R&D-rms employ HA
t researchers to develop
At+1   At new blueprints and sell them at price pA
t . Facing research productivity  output is given
by
At+1   At = HA
t : (12)
Research productivity  is given to the single rm but depends, on the aggregate level, positively
on the number of already existing ideas (0 <  < 1, standing-on-shoulders eect) and possibly
negatively on the size of the workforce (0   < 1, stepping-on-toes),  =  AL , where   > 0 is a
scaling parameter. Note that the negative stepping-on-toes eect increases in physical labor Lt not
in aggregate human capital Ht. The reason is that there cannot be stepping-on-toes with respect to
individual ht because the same person will not develop the same idea twice.
Maximization of prots pA
t HA
t  wtHA
t leads to labor demand such that wt = pA
t . Labor demand




122.7. Market Clearing and Equilibrium Dynamics. In equilibrium, wages in goods production
and R&D equalize such that pA
t = (1 )Yt=HY
t . By inserting demand (10) into the goods price pt =
rt= and the result into prots, the free entry condition can be written as pA
t = t = (1 )Yt=At.
Next, use these two equations for pA
t to eliminate the price of blueprints and to arrive at labor
demand HY
t = A=() and thus HA
t = Ht   A=().
Inserting employment of researchers HA
t from (13), the denition of R&D productivity , and the
denition of aggregate human capital into research output (12) provides the evolution of TFP as a
function of current TFP At, human capital per person ht, and size of the workforce Lt,







which constitutes the human-capital augmented Romer-Jones result. In contrast to standard R&D-
based growth theory we want to include also an era without market R&D in order to explore the
model in a unied growth framework. There is no R&D when the non-negativity constraint for
employment in R&D, HA
t  0 is binding, that is for Ht  A=(). If the aggregate stock of human
capital is suciently low all labor supply is absorbed by the nal goods sector and R&D as a market
activity does not take place.
The population grows at the fertility rate, implying that next period's workforce is
Lt+1 = ntLt: (15)
For convenience physical capital is assumed to fully depreciate between periods t and t+1 such that
next period's capital stock consists of this period's savings. Inserting into Kt+1 = stLt, the solution
for savings (2) and wages from (9) and (11) and substituting HY
t = A=() provides evolution of
aggregate capital as (16).




with ~ Bt  (1   )( )=(1 +  + )Bt. The evolution of the economy is fully described by the
four-dimensional system (6) and (14)-(16).
3. The Balanced Growth Path
3.1. The Inverse Correlation between Productivity Growth and Population Growth. A
balanced growth path (BGP) is dened as a state of the economy at which growth rates do not
change. For any variable x, the growth rate is denoted by gx;t = (xt+1   xt)=xt and its rate of
13change by ^ gx;t  (gxt+1   gxt)=gxt. Balanced growth thus requires ^ gx = 0 for x = A;K;h;L. We
denote a growth rate of x along the BGP by gx, i.e. by omitting the time index. Naturally, because
of decreasing returns of learning-by-doing, gB = 0. Along the BGP productivity growth is solely




















Supercial inspection thus seemingly suggests that TFP growth and population growth are positively
correlated. This is the macro-view of the economy, which disregards interaction on the micro-level
and seemingly predicts { in line with the available R&D-based growth literature { that higher
population growth leads to higher productivity growth.
From micro-foundation, however, we have derived that both human capital and fertility are en-
dogenous and inversely correlated via the quantity-quality trade-o. Along a balanced growth path
with positive growth wtht is perpetually growing and fertility and the gross growth rate of human










(1 +  + )
1 
:
Obviously, the most positive role that population growth could possibly play for TFP growth exists
when there is no congestion in research, i.e. for  = 0. In this case the expression simplies further
and the balanced growth rate of TFP and { after inserting (5) into (15) { the population growth




1 +  + 
1=(1 )
  1; gL =
   
(1 +  + )
  1: (18)
Inspecting the growth rates shows that a higher weight of child quality in utility causes gA to
rise and gL to fall. The opposite holds true for a decreasing weight of child quantity in utility. A
proposition summarizes the main result of the paper.
Proposition 1. A higher weight on child quality  or a lower weight on child quantity  implies
a higher rate of TFP growth and a lower rate of population growth along the balanced growth path.
This means that for two otherwise identical economies TFP growth is higher in the one in which
parents put relatively less weight on child quantity, that is the one in which the fertility transition
ends at a lower level of population growth. Congestion in research ( > 0) amplies this result by
14reducing the role of nt in TFP growth. More importantly, note that the result is independent from
the size of nt. In particular, it holds also when population growth gL = nt   1 is negative. Ceteris
paribus, declining population is good for TFP growth along the balanced growth path.
For an intuition of the result recall the denition of aggregate human capital Ht = htLt. Without
congestion a positive eect of declining population on productivity requires that a higher preference
for child quality exerts a stronger eect on human capital endowment per person of the next genera-
tion than on the number of persons such that ht grows more than Lt falls. This is exactly what our
model-parents provide. Inserting (5) and (7) into Ht+1=Ht = nt  (ht+1=ht) we obtain the growth
















1 +  + 
> 0:
The mechanism behind the result originates from the interaction in the budget constraint (and
not from specications of the utility function). To see this clearly consider a unit increase of et
in company with a unit reduction of nt such that total voluntary child expenditure ntet remains
constant. This one-to{one quantity-quality substitution is not neutral. It sets free income wtht
because less time is needed for child rearing so that more time can be supplied on the labor market.
The additionally earned income can be spend on current and future consumption and on further
child expenditure et implying that the negative eect from reduction of fertility is smaller than the
positive eect on human capital such that Ht = htnt rises. Because the mechanism arises from the
budget constraint, we are condent that the result holds also for more general forms of the utility
function.
Turning towards the impact of time costs of children we see from (18) that a change of  aects
population growth but not productivity growth. Intuitively, rising costs of children lead to lower
fertility and higher voluntary expenditure per child. For aggregate human capital Ht = htLt the
negative eect through lower fertility and the positive eect via higher human capital growth per
capita are exactly leveling each other such that Ht+1=Ht = AE=(1 +  + ) is independent from 
and thus @gH=@ = 0.
The mechanics behind the result originate again from the budget constraint, but this time log-
utility and its feature of balancing income and substitution eects plays a role as well. Higher child
costs lead to lower child demand nt and lower available income (1   nt)wtht. With unchanged
preferences income and substitution eect are balancing each other such that total expenditure
15ntet remains constant. A utility function supporting a higher substitution eect would imply an
overcompensating eect of human capital over fertility.
Besides manipulating the utility function, an eect of  on TFP growth could also be motivated by
congestion. If there is congestion in R&D, i.e. if  > 0 in gA = n1 
t (ht+1=ht), then the positive eect
through rising human capital dominates the negative eect through falling fertility, an observation,
which proves the following proposition.
Proposition 2. If there is congestion in R&D (stepping on toes) then increasing time costs for
rearing children leads to lower population growth and higher TFP growth along the balanced growth
path.
3.2. Income Growth and Population Growth. In order to examine the rest of the model, we














Without congestion in R&D ( = 0) the model predicts that growth of physical capital along the
balanced growth path correlates positively with TFP growth but not with population growth. For
 ! 1 the model predicts that the capital stock grows at the rate of TFP growth. Note the dierence
to neoclassical growth theory, which predicts that the capital stock grows at the rate of TFP growth
plus the rate of population growth. With human capital and R&D being endogenous, a positive
association between capital growth and population growth emerges \only" when there is congestion
in research.
Finally, substitute labor demand HY
t = At=() into production (11) and take time-dierences to
get output growth gY t = (1 + gKt)(1 + gAt)(1 )(2 )(1 + gLt)(1 )   1. Insert this information
into growth of output per worker yt = Yt=Lt, i.e. into (1 + gyt) = (1 + gY t)=(1 + gLt). In order to
evaluate income per capita growth along the balanced growth path insert gA and gK from (17) and
(19) to arrive at (20).










Supercial inspection suggests again a seemingly positive association between income growth gy and
population growth (fertility). With contrast to conventional R&D-based growth theory, our micro-
foundation of fertility can again be utilized to reconcile the model's predictions with the empirical
16facts. Inserting n and h from (5) and (5) into (10) provides (21).













Taking the derivatives with respect to  and  provides a result analogously to Proposition 1.
Proposition 3. A higher weight on child quality in utility or a lower weight on child quantity
implies a higher rate of growth of income per capita and a lower rate of population growth along the
balanced growth path.
Furthermore, since 2    > 1   :
Proposition 4. Higher child-rearing costs  imply a higher rate of growth of income per capita
and a lower rate of population growth along the balanced growth path.
It is instructive to compare R&D eort along the BGP with the earlier R&D-based growth models.
Models of the rst generation (Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992) predict constant TFP growth
for a constant number of researchers. For this to be true the knife-edge assumption  = 1 has to
hold. Models of the second generation (Jones, 1995, Segerstrom, 1998) predict based on  < 1
that constant TFP growth is realized for a constant population share of researchers and positive
population growth, implying that constant economic growth requires a perpetually rising number
of people employed in R&D and perpetually rising R&D expenditure. Ha and Howitt (2007) have
argued that empirical evidence for the U.S. growth experience after 1950 supports models of the
rst generation. Models of the rst generation, however, have the unpleasant features of being based
on the knife-edge assumption  = 1 and of relying on a constant population. The present theory
reconciles the earlier theories. It abandons the knife-edge assumption but preserves the empirical
relevant associations between research eort and TFP.
Proposition 5. Along the balanced growth path constant TFP growth is associated with a constant
share of the population working in R&D and constant R&D expenditure share of GDP. These results
hold true for  < 1 irrespective of whether the number of people employed in R&D is rising, constant,
or declining. If the population stays constant, constant TFP growth implies a constant number of
workers engaged in R&D.
17For a proof let the number of workers in goods production be denoted by LY
t . Begin with noting
that the share of workers in goods production is given by LY
t =Lt = (htLY
t )(htLt)= = HY
t =Ht. Insert
HY
t = At=(Ht) and the denitions of Ht and  to get LY




from (17) that numerator and denominator of this expression are growing at equal rates at the
steady-state. Thus LY
t =Lt stays constant implying a constant population share in R&D.
For the second part of the proof, R&D expenditure is given by Rt = wtHA
t and its share of GDP
by Rt=Yt = wtHA
t =Yt. Insert wages from (9) to get Rt=Yt = (1 )HA
t =HY
t , which is constant since
HY
t =Ht and HA
t =Ht are constant along the steady-state.
3.3. Growth of Modern vs. Post Modern Economies. Standard unied growth theory usually
assumes that the fertility transition ends in the Modern Era when fertility arrives at the replacement
rate or at a rate that supports positive population growth. Our model allows the fertility transition
to end below replacement level, a phenomenon which we identied as the Post-Modern Era. Consider
two otherwise identical economies, one in which preferences support non-negative population growth
along the BGP (the modern economy) and one in which preferences imply negative population growth
along the BGP (the post-modern economy). Applying Proposition 4 and 5 { which hold irrespective
of the size of n { we arrive at the following conclusion.
Proposition 6. Growth of income per capita is { ceteris paribus { higher for the post-modern
economy than for the modern economy.
The intuition for the result has been developed in the context of Propositions 1-5. Summarizing,
a change of preferences which causes a child quantity-quality substitution frees extra parental time
that is used to earn extra income of which a part is invested in education. As a consequence the
positive impact of the preference change on education exceeds the negative impact on population
size such that aggregate human capital H = hL and TFP are growing at higher rates than before.
If there is congestion in R&D a second positive eect shows up because there is less stepping-on-toes.
4. Adjustment Dynamics over the Very Long Run
The present theory of R&D-driven technological progress predicts a negative association of TFP
growth and population growth, a result in line with the cross-country evidence for the second half
of the 20th century. For the most part of human history, however, Kremer (1993) has impressively
documented a positive association between population growth and TFP growth. These two facts can
18be explained in a unied theory of economic growth once we take into account that in pre-modern
times market R&D contributed little to productivity growth and there was no (mass) education
(Mokyr, 2002). Instead a Malthusian mechanism was operative such that TFP growth through
learning-by-doing activities translated only very gradually to growth of income per capita (Galor,
2005).
In this section we investigate long-run adjustment dynamics towards balanced growth. Initially,
in the pre-modern era, both non-negativity constraints, wtht   z  0 and Ht = Ltht   At=()  0
are binding with equality implying that there is neither market R&D nor mass education. Growth
is solely driven by learning-by-doing as in Kremer (1993) and in Galor (2005) during the Malthusian
era. Our model does not entail a general prediction which of the two non-negativity constraints is
relaxed rst but in the following we propose a calibration where market R&D sets in rst (with
the rst Industrial Revolution around 1760) and triggers later on, around 1860, the onset of (mass)
education. Such a scenario seems not only to be in line with the historical evolution of England and
Western Europe (Galor, 2005). It also allows us to investigate a transitional period in which R&D
growth is fueled solely by population growth; i.e. by the mechanism that is assumed to drive growth
at the steady-state according to the semi-endogenous R&D-based growth literature (Jones, 1995).
In order to see how our theory relates to the semi-endogenous R&D-based growth literature it is
instructive to assume for a moment AE = 0 such that schooling is unproductive and parents abstain





From this we indeed conclude that there is a unique positive association between productivity growth
and population growth. The model has collapsed to an overlapping generations version of the well-
known semi-endogenous growth model (Jones, 1995).
In a unied growth context, however, a period of R&D-based growth without education constitutes
only a transitory phase and not a steady-state phenomenon. Eventually rising income triggers
education, the education constraint becomes non-binding, and the demographic transition sets in.
With rising human capital and declining fertility the economy converges towards the balanced growth
path. While standard R&D-based growth theory would predict that economic growth declines with
ongoing demographic transition because of declining population growth, the above steady-state
analysis on the quality-quantity substitution lets us expect that a similar mechanism holds also
19along the adjustment path such that economic growth is expected to increase with the demographic
transition. We verify the intuition with a numerical calibration of the model.
For the benchmark run we set the parameters , , and  such that the model produces a savings
rate of 0.2, a population growth rate of 0.2 before the demographic transition sets in, and one
of -0.075 at the end of the demographic transition. Assuming that rearing a child takes away 10
percent of adult time ( = 0:1) this leads to the estimate  = 0:29,  = 0:04,  = 0:18. After
running the simulation we convert generational into annual data for better comparison with the
actual historical time series. Assuming that a generation takes 25 years, the above setting implies a
population growth rate of 0.92 percent before the onset of the transition and of -0.39 at the end of
the transition. It also implies that two adults (a couple) have 2.4 surviving children before the onset
of the demographic transition and 1.85 children after completion of the transition. The latter value
matches the currently observed TFR in the UK and the TFR to which all countries are predicted
to converge in the long-run according to the UN (2008) medium-variant projection.
We set  = 0:4,  = 0:5,  = 0:2, and AE = 39 such that along the balanced growth path
income per capita grows at 1.5 percent annually, GDP grows at 1.1 percent and TFP grows at 0.7
percent. We assume a learning-by-doing function gB = L and set the remaining parameters ,
,  , and  e to roughly approximate the historical evolution of England. In particular we set these
parameters (and the starting value L0) such that R&D-based growth commences in the mid 18th
century (patented innovations of the rst Industrial Revolution), such that mass education and the
demographic transition sets in in the mid 19th century (with the second Industrial Revolution), and
such that a productivity slowdown sets in in the 1970s. This leads to the estimates  =  = 0:05,
  = 0:5, and  e = 0:03.
Solid lines in Figure 2 show the implied adjustment dynamics. The model predicts correctly the
onset of the fertility decline to occur in sync with the onset of mass education in the mid 19th century.
It fails to predict, however, an increase of population growth during the 18th and early 19th century
because we have not taken into account mortality. Accounting for mortality and its positive impact
on net fertility would produce a hump-shaped transition path of population growth (See Herzer et
al., 2011, Strulik and Weisdorf, 2011). The bottom panel in Figure 2 shows the evolution of income
per capita (in logs). Income starts to increase somewhat with the onset of R&D-based growth and
then really takes o with the onset of mass education. The quantity-quality substitution discussed
20Figure 2: Long-Run Adjustment Dynamics













































Solid lines: benchmark economy. Fertility of two adults stabilizes at 1.85 in line with the UN (2007)
TFR projection. Dashed lines: alternative economy. Fertility of two adults stabilizes at 2.1 Both
economies share the same parameter specication except  = 0:04 for benchmark and  = 0:02 for
alternative economy (see text for details).
in Section 3 as a balanced growth phenomenon is also clearly visible as a phenomenon of adjustment
dynamics: the growth rate of aggregate human capital (gH, third panel) increases in line with the
21fertility decline because education (gh, second panel) increases more strongly than fertility (gL, rst
panel) decreases.
An increasingly well educated population leads with delay of one generation to a further increase
of R&D-based growth in the late 18th and early 19th century (gA, fourth panel). The model thus
explains how a rst Industrial Revolution brought forward by tinkerers initiated a second Industrial
Revolution produced by formally trained scientists. In other words, it explains the transition from
propositional knowledge towards prescriptive knowledge as the main driver of technological progress
(Mokyr, 2005). In this sense, declining population growth was good for economic growth because it
initiated a quality-quantity substitution of the workforce.
For the 21st century and beyond the model predicts human capital growth to decline towards its
steady-state value and, as a consequence, growth of R&D and income per capita decline towards their
steady-state levels as well. The model thus interprets the productivity slowdown as a phenomenon
of adjustment dynamics, that is as overshooting behavior and adjustment towards \normal" from
above.
Dashed lines in Figure 2 show adjustment dynamics for an alternative economy in which the
transition ends at a fertility rate of 2.1 children per couple of adults, i.e. slightly above replacement
rate. For that purpose we have reduced  from 0.04 to 0.02 and kept all other parameters from the
benchmark model. The higher preference for child quantity delays the onset of the fertility decline
and mass education. More importantly, it leads also to less growth of human capital, initially as well
as in the long-run. As a consequence the alternative economy produces less innovations (inferior gA)
and income per capita grows less steeply as in the benchmark economy. Our major results proved in
the theoretical part as steady-state phenomena are thus also observed as phenomena of transitional
dynamics: lower population growth is good for R&D-driven innovations and economic growth.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we have integrated into an R&D-based growth model an endogenous, microfounded
evolution of population growth and human capital accumulation and have shown how this modies
some conclusions from earlier R&D-driven growth theory. While earlier models (in the spirit of
Romer 1990 or Jones 1995) predicted that population growth is positively associated with economic
growth, or even { in the Jones case { essential for having economic growth at all, our micro-founded
22theory predicts that population growth is negatively associated with productivity growth and income
growth. It is therewith harder to falsify by the available data for the 20th century.
Since we have maintained all central elements about the rms' side from R&D-based growth theory
it is clear that the new results originate from household behavior. The basic mechanism is generated
by the interaction of child quality and quantity in the households' budget constraint and is observed
independently from the specication of preferences, which makes us condent that our results are
robust against a sophistication of the households' utility function.
Specically, a substitution of child quantity n by child quality (i.e. expenditure on education) e
that keeps total child expenditure e  n constant sets free parental time, which can be used to earn
extra income. The additional income is partly spent on education such that overall child expenditure
rises more strongly than child quantity falls. At the macro side of the economy this trade-o means
that human capital per person h increases more strongly than the number of persons L falls such
that total available human capital h  L increases. Given that human capital is the driving force in
R&D this entails higher R&D output and higher R&D-based growth.
In a unied growth setting we have shown that this phenomenon is not only observable along the
balanced growth path but also during the adjustment phase. The unied growth model has also
produced novel insights about the timing of the onset of mass education and R&D-based growth.
It is capable to explain how a rst Industrial Revolution brought forward by tinkerers initiated a
second Industrial Revolution produced by formally trained scientists. These details about the timing
of long-run growth cannot be explained by the so far available growth theories because they neglect
either R&D-based growth (unied growth theory) or the micro-foundation of fertility and human
capital accumulation (conventional R&D-based growth theory).
Taking the quality-quantity trade-o into account allowed us to draw a much less grim conclusion
about economic growth in the near future than suggested by the conventional R&D-based growth
literature. The crucial ingredient that makes perpetual growth possible is not that there are constant
returns in education for the individual. To see this note that along the balanced growth path the
model predicts that the expenditure share of education is constant (the OLG equivalent of a constant
share of life-time spent on education in the non-overlapping generations, Mincer-type approach to
education). The model could thus be easily generalized towards decreasing returns at the individual
level. The crucial ingredient enabling perpetual growth is the linear intergenerational transmission of
human capital, i.e. the assumption that the current generation is capable to transport its knowledge
23times a multiplier larger than one to the next generation. While it is impossible to say whether such
a process of knowledge transmission can be sustained forever, it is in any case easier conceivable than
a perpetually growing population. Human capital is a metaphysical entity measured in value-units
(compare, for example, the value of knowledge acquired by a university study of medical science
now and 100 years ago) whereas population is a physical entity bounded by physical constraints, for
example, space on earth.
Instead of venturing forth into the domain of speculation about the distant future of humanity we
would like to emphasize that our model is a metaphor to explain economic growth in the past, the
present, and the near future (say within the limit of the time horizon of a century). It is not a theory
for economic growth in the very distant future. In the recent past, we observed high TFP growth
in line with high growth of human capital and low and increasingly negative population growth,
and we expect these trends to continue for a while. In this respect the main message delivered by
the model is an optimistic one: the fact that fertility is below replacement level and population is
declining is less threatening than suggested by conventional R&D-based growth theory.
In the very long-run it is likely that fertility below replacement and negative population growth
run against physical and economic limits. This insight could have been another reason why the UN
recently reconsidered its 2008 projections; assuming now adjustment to replacement level from below
at the end of the 21. century. If population density becomes too thin we would expect indivisibilities
to occur and technologies to become increasingly resistant against quantity-quality substitution. We
would then expect that markets (or policies) react by generating a lower relative price of children.
With ongoing adjustment of prices we would probably expect indeed convergence towards a stable
population in the very long-run. Strulik and Weisdorf (2008) have developed a unied growth
model of a two-nal-goods economy, which endogenously produces convergence towards a stationary
population in the very long-run and which predicts undershooting and negative population growth
during the 21st century as a transitional phenomenon. Combining these ideas with the present work
is a challenging task for the future.
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